HISTORY OF SPACE POLICY
The space age began as a race for security and prestige between two superpowers. The opportunities were boundless, and the decades that followed have seen a radical transformation in the way we live our daily lives, in large part due to our use of space…When the space age began, the opportunities to use space were limited to only a few nations, and there were limited consequences for irresponsible or unintentional behavior. Now, we find ourselves in a world where the benefits of space permeate almost every facet of our lives. The growth and evolution of the global economy has ushered in an ever-increasing number of nations and organizations using space. 2 There is very little literature addressing the history of space policy. Strategists use history to garner lessons from the past, and then they apply those lessons to the present to prevent mistakes from occurring in the future.
Correlating significant geostrategic events with space policy during the 20 th and early 21 st centuries will identify trends and lessons learned in how U.S. space policy is formed and developed.
Domestically, a correlation exists between the evolution of space policy and significant events that occurred during each presidential administration. U.S. process for developing space policy lacked foresight. When it came to developing space policy, every administration seemed to start anew. This lack of foresight established a short term view to space problems which resulted in short term fixes leading to long term problems like excessive space debris and congestion.
Internationally, satellite providers expanded beyond governments to include consortiums and corporations which have created challenges. The United Nations (U.N.) is the only body that addresses space issues internationally. Unfortunately the U.N. lacks an interagency and multi-national process to account for the economic consequences or various space policies, and non-state actors involved in this domain.
By analyzing significant geopolitical events that occurred during presidential administrations and space policy development, there are definite trends in how
Presidents developed and created space policy. Space policies during this period had a profound negative effect on future satellite system survivability and the management of the space domain.
The fourth period of history was the first decade of the 21 st century -the age of globalization, weapons of mass destruction and the War on Terrorism. During this period, senior leaders realized the negative consequences from past leaders' shortsighted space policy development. The results of past mistakes culminated in a congested environment, actors testing ASAT weapons, and massive debris fields.
United States' space policy from its inception has lacked foresight and each presidential administration's emphasis on space was varied. In addition, the international community lacks an interagency and multi-national process to better manage the space domain.
Space Fundamentals
To understand space policy a basic understanding of the space environment is essential. Understanding the fundamentals of space will assist in comprehending why political leaders advocated the exploitation of the space domain to the degree they did.
Space starts at an altitude approximately 63 miles above the surface of the earth. This is where atmospheric aerodynamic principles end and orbital mechanic principles (Kepler's Law) start. Any object that moves around the earth has an orbit. The orbit is defined by three factors. First is the shape of the orbit, which can be circular or elliptical. Second factor is the altitude of the orbit, which is the distance of the satellite from the surface of the earth. The altitude also determines the rate at which the satellite orbits the earth. This rate or time it takes for a satellite to orbit the earth is called a period. For example, a satellite can be set at an altitude that allows the orbit to circle the earth at the exact same rate the earth rotates on its axis. In this situation, the satellite stays directly over the same location above the equator. This type of orbit is called a geostationary orbit and is optimum for communications satellites (e.g. Direct TV). Third is the angle of the orbit with respect to the equator, which is called inclination. If a satellite is set at a 90 degree inclination its orbit will be directly over the poles. Satellite's orbits are established to maximize satellite capabilities (Figure 1 ). rocket, later to be named the V-2 or Vengeance Weapon 2, 6 was the ultimate weapon.
Hitler's comment upon receiving the program brief from von Braun was "Europe and the rest of the world will be too small to contain such a war with such weapons. Humanity will not be able to endure it." 7 U.S. leaders were aware of the potential of this new rocket technology, and after the war captured von Braun. His knowledge and expertise in the field of rocket science and engineering was instrumental in developing the U.S.'s space and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs.
The Soviet Union also possessed the scientists and technology needed to put objects in space. In 1949 the Soviet's also acquired nuclear weapons capability. 8 There was no turning back the Cold War and the race to dominate the space domain commenced.
The 1950s and 60s were the infancy of space exploration and the Cold War.
Both were intertwined and had a conjoined relationship to their maturation and direction.
Rockets provided the U.S. with the ability to spy on the Soviet Union and this technology led to the nuclear ballistic missile. The Cold War was the focus of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration, and it was this war that drove initial U.S.
space policy and strategy.
In November 1954, President Eisenhower, determined to make strategic reconnaissance a national policy, approved the high flying U-2 reconnaissance airplane in a very highly classified project known as "AQUATONE." 9 In order for air-breathing reconnaissance aircraft to be effective over the Soviet Union, Eisenhower offered the Soviet Union a proposal to give both the U.S. and the Soviet Union reconnaissance over-flight rights to each other's country. In 1955, President Eisenhower brought Open Skies proposal to Geneva to give both the Soviet Union and the U.S. access to each other's airspace. Khrushchev refused to accept the proposal, but the U.S. continued over-flights of the Soviet Union. 10 On May 1, 1960, Francis Gary Power was shot down by an SA-2 high altitude surface to air missile. 11 The U-2 shootdown further exacerbated the arms race.
President Eisenhower's need for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to fly over denied access areas became a high priority for the administration.
One of President Eisenhower's classified military space programs was the CORONA Project. 12 The CORONA Project's purpose was to accomplish shows the total number of objects catalogued (documented) as having been in space.
The bottom graph (Figure 2) shows the number of objects in orbit any given year. In summary, domestic and international processes were inadequate to keep up with current emerging space events. In 1968, the Soviet Union successfully launched its first satellite interceptor, and by 1973 the Soviet Union had completed a fully operational facility. 31 There was no engagement by the U.S. or the international community with the Soviet Union for this dangerous precedent. There was also an increase in the number of commercial entities and consortiums building and launching satellites. During the Carter administration, 14 countries/consortiums/corporations owned satellites in space. 32 Neither U.S. leadership nor the international community had a process to assess the past, present and future impacts of such occurrences.
End of the Cold War -1980s and 1990s
The Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations all recognized the utility of the space domain in achieving national security objectives. Unfortunately, all three administrations suffered from a short sighted approach to space policy.
The Reagan administration focused on ending the Cold War. President Reagan increased the DoD budget to pre-and early-Nixon administration levels. 6.2% of the GDP or 28.1% of the total federal budget went to defense. Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.
The United States will pursue a ballistic missile defense program to provide for: enhanced theater missile defense capability later this decade; a national missile defense deployment readiness program as a hedge against the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States; and an advanced technology program to provide options for improvements to planned and deployed defenses. 39 The policy was outdated and did not address the evolving space environment.
Until the 1980s the Soviet Union and the U.S. had a monopoly on space based capabilities. 40 The bi-polar space race gave way to commercial exploitation of the space domain by other governments, commercial interests, and consortiums. These two administrations sustained military space-based funding. The DoD continued its ISR launches at a rate of 0 to 4 annually. This has been the standard launch rate for DoD satellites for the past two decades. 42 Meanwhile during this period, eleven countries were operating 22 launch sites. 43 More than 60 nations and government consortia owned and operated satellites. 44 The U.S. share of worldwide satellite exports dropped from nearly 2/3 in 1997 to 1/3 in 2008. 45 With the increase in the number of providers and users of satellites, and the increased proliferation of launch capable countries, there was also an increase in the development of ASAT and counterspace capabilities. 46 The U.S. as the hegemonic presence in space was now at risk.
The preservation of the right to use space for the good of all mankind will be the space policy issue for the U.S. and the international community in the coming years.
The space domain has become a significantly more challenging operating environment due to the lack of foresight in domestic and international space policy and law. There is an increasing effort by foreign parties to interfere with satellite operations. To put these events in perspective, more than 4,700 space missions have been conducted since the beginning of the space age, and only 10 missions have accounted for one-third of all debris orbiting the earth. Alarmingly, six of these ten debrisproducing events have occurred within the past 10 years. 48 The spike in the amount of debris from these two events mentioned above (Figure 3 ) created an entirely new dynamic in how the U.S. and the international community view this domain. India is also developing an ASAT weapon. 54 The U.S. effort to develop an ASAT created a precedent for other countries. It is ironic that the concerns in the 2011 Space
Strategy regarding operations in a degraded space environment were partly due to U.S.
policies and 1970s and 1980s and U.S. ASAT capabilities. History has shown that other countries will emulate U.S. technology and space capabilities to further their national interests and increase their prestige, in some cases at the expense of U.S.
national interests.
The lack of foresight concerning the space domain has left President Obama with no options than to accept commercial/civilian satellite support, and a potential adversary's counter-space capabilities as the current state of affairs. The U.S.'s inability to assess long term consequences of its policies has put U.S. national interests in space at risk. If civilian senior leadership had domestic processes that weighed past space policies and accounted for potential future effects of current policy, perhaps ASAT proliferation would not be a problem today.
Conclusion
In conclusion, presidents and their administrations lack of foresight established a reactionary short term view on space policy to the detriment of long term sustainability of space capabilities. When analyzing the origins of space policy, this lack of foresight is understandable. In the 1950s and 60s space exploration and the Cold War were intertwined. Rockets provided the U.S. with the ability to spy on the Soviet Union, enabled space exploration and led to the nuclear ballistic missile. Although President
Eisenhower and President Kennedy were visionaries in their efforts to set the foundation to operate in space, their space policies were reactionary and they failed to understand the consequences of their policies. During the early years of space exploration, only the U.S. and Soviet Union exploited the space domain. The space domain had very few objects on orbit and the domain was only used for three purposes--exploration, spying and nuclear ballistic missiles. Policy was focused on winning the space race at the expense of a long view.
Although the utility and complexity of the space domain has slowly increased over the years, it seems subsequent U.S. administrations failed to adjust policy to keep pace with the change. Each administration's advocacy on space support and policy varied depending on the administration's personality and preoccupation. When an administration decided to develop a space policy, it seemed to start anew every time.
Unfortunately, the pace of globalization and technology exceeded the U.S.'s ability to create effective space policy relevant to the changing conditions.
Even when administrations were focused on space, the lack of foresight in U.S.
space policy could have an adverse effect on U.S. national interests in space. During President Reagan's administration, past U.S. led U.N. resolutions were ignored. The
United States' development of the direct ascent ASAT weapon would provide a precedent leading to the Chinese testing their own ASAT weapon. This test created a debris field of over 3,000 objects. Even if a president's administration identified a negative trend, the trend was never addressed in policy. Most administrations' lack of foresight combined with little sense of continuity on space matters prevented U.S.
leaders from seeing the long term effects of policy.
The international community needs an interagency process that provides expertise, and authority to recommend and enforce international space policy, treaties and laws. There are a number of international companies, consortiums and countries that have satellites in orbit, but there is no effective process to manage the space domain. Many of the challenges that exist in space, for instance debris, are international problems which the UN does not have the authority to address. The U.N.'s five treaties and numerous resolutions focus primarily on the peaceful uses of space.
There is no policy on the management of the domain with the exception of U.N.
Resolution 2777, which addresses liability for damage caused by space objects.
There is no simple solution to the challenges of operating in space. As a start, there needs to be a process within the international community that provides dedicated expertise, authority and processes to manage all aspects of the space domain, similar to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The U.N., in its current capacity,
is not an adequate solution because it does not address the needs of consortiums and corporations that interact with the space domain.
The negative consequences of the status quo in space are clear. If the U.S. and the international community do not change how they manage this space domain, the future of space exploration is bleak.
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